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Open report 
Short Summary: 
-Cost overrun involves unexpected costs incurred in excess of budget amounts due to 
different factors. It has been a common phenomenon in civil engineering projects and has 
been the source of conflicts between stakeholders of the projects. Within this in mind, this 
thesis investigated cost overrun factors in road project at the Norwegian Public   
Roads Administration- pedestrian and cyclist bridge at skansen.The project is located in 
Sør-Trøndelag and it is a swing bridge and located between Ila and Brattøra. The 
Project is located and officially opened for traffic on October 2014. 
The initial cost of the project was 104 million NOK and the cost of the project when it is 
completed was 111 million NOK. Cost overrun is the amount of money that excess of the initial 
budget of the project. In this case project, after I made an investigation on several document 
that are related the project and having interviewed key stakeholders of the project, I have 
conclude that the size of the cost overrun of the project is 7 % and try to developing  mitigating 
measure.  
Key words: 
               -  Cost overrun       
                  -  Actual cost 
               -  Estimated cost 
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Summary 
Cost overrun involves unexpected costs incurred in excess of budget amounts due to different 
factors.  It has been a common phenomenon in civil engineering projects and has been the 
source of conflicts between stakeholders of projects. Following on this identifying the main 
causes of cost overrun and developing mitigating measures have been the subject of 
discussions in construction project management profession.  
Within this in mind, this thesis investigated cost overrun factors in a road project at the 
Norwegian Public Roads Administration focusing on a project - Pedestrian and cyclist bridge at 
Skansen. The project is located in Sør-Trøndelag and it is a swing bridge and located between 
Ila and Brattøra. The project completed and officially opened for traffic on October 2014. The 
initial cost of the projects was 104 million NOK and the cost of the project when it is 
completed was 111 million NOK.  Cost overrun is the amount of money that is in excess of the 
initial budget of the project. In this case project, after I made an investigation on several 
documents that are related to the project and having interviewed key stakeholders of the 
project, I have concluded that the size of the cost overrun of the project is 7%. 
Once observing the project has incurred additional costs, I started to focus into two basic 
research questions: Why the project incurred additional costs?  And what factors had the 
most significant impact in increasing the final cost of the project?  These questions were not 
easy to get answers because the topic is sensitive and has been difficult to get genuine 
answers from the project stakeholders.  
However to get answers for my research questions, I studied all the available project 
documents and interviewed key people who have stakes on the project. Different factors that 
contributed for the cost overrun identified. Weak project planning in the early project design 
phase, several changes during the construction period and unexpected ground condition are 
among them.  
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1. INTRODUCATION  
1.1 General 
Construction project is a mission undertaken to create a unique facility, product or service 
within specified scope, quality, time and cost (Chitkara, 2004). Road is one of the most 
important construction projects and it has a great impact on the economy of all countries. 
Many researchers argue that road infrastructures provide crucial ingredients for the 
economy. 
In practice, however, road construction projects are beating their budget repeatedly and they 
are affecting the economies of many countries. Therefore, cost overrun in road projects 
require an in-depth investigation to improve the out puts of the project. These days, it is not 
uncommon to see road construction projects exceed their budget and failing to achieve their 
mission of creating facilities within specified cost. Hardly few projects get completed within 
the budget since construction projects are undertaken in an uncertain environment. These 
include construction complexity; presence of various interest groups such as the project 
owners, end users ,consultants ,contractors ,financiers; materials, equipment, project 
funding; environmental conditions; and political environment and statutory regulations. 
Like many other countries in the world, construction industry in Norway has had cost overrun 
problems. For example, the study conducted by office of the Auditor General of Norway in 
2013 based on 80 project indicted that projects recorded on average 20% cost overrun. In 
addition to this, 25% of the projects could not be finished on the scheduled project time; 
rather delayed for a minimum of six months. 
 
1.2 Cost overrun   
Cost performance and the management of cost overruns is an important topic in many 
countries, the construction field, and it has been a discussion point in the political arena. The 
problem of cost overrun especially in road projects is a worldwide phenomenon. It has been 
one of the main causes for disputes among different stakeholders of construction projects  
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such as clients, consultants and contractors. Project cost overruns can create a significant 
financial risk to clients. However, in spite of the risk involved, the history of the construction 
industry is full of projects that were completed with significant cost overruns (Garry, 2005). 
1.3 The Norwegian approach 
In response to problem of cost overruns on major projects, in Norway, the Ministry of Finance 
set up a quality assurance system to provide assurance to the decision makers. This quality 
assurance system is a mandatory independent review of the financial effectiveness of public 
investment projects in Norway with an excepted budget exceeding 750 million NOK.  
The purpose of quality assurance (QA2) approach to ensure the quality of the decision basis 
including cost estimate and uncertainties associated with the chosen project alternative 
before it is submitted to the parliament for funding. The control of the project costs is the 
main feature in this exercise. In addition, the evaluation focuses on challenges related to the 
project management in the implementation phase. 
The control gate (QA2) of the Norwegian quality at the entry regime used to control cost 
overrun. It starts with verification of estimates of projects and analysis of the probable risks of 
the project. At this stage, there are different requirements that developed and used as a 
reference to evaluate a proposed cost. The evaluation is conducted by independent 
consulting companies and aimed to give an independent assessment of the project cost. 
As a basis for the QA2 exercise, the following document must prepared by the responsible 
ministry/agency: 
A) An overall project management document. 
B) A complete cost estimate 
C) An assessment of at least two alternative contract strategies 
The independent consultant shall review these documents, and also undertake an 
independent assessment of success factors and pitfalls, and quantify the uncertainty related 
to total cost. On that basis, the consultant shall give recommendation regarding:               
                 - Total cost frame for the project, including necessary contingency reserves to a 
count for uncertainty, and cost frame for the responsible agency. 
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                  - How the project should be managed to maximize the probability that the cost 
frame will hold and organized to ensure an efficient implementation. 
This is a very good initiative to control the quality of cost estimates before the decision is 
made and the projects started. However, the system does not consider project initiatives that 
have initial estimates below 750 million NOK. Due to this fact, my case project did not 
undergo a quality assurance test (QA2). The following Figure 1 indicated the Norwegian 
quality assurance system for major projects.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Norwegian quality assurance system for major projects 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis structured in nine parts.  
The first part introduces the rationale of the research – cost overrun: it gives the general 
overview about cost overrun, the Norwegian budget approach for public projects, and 
discusses the research approach and methodology. 
The second part presents the definition of cost overrun written by different authors, the 
causes of cost overrun, effects, the way to minimize cost overrun, how to estimate cost at 
different stages of a project, and presents an explanation for cost underestimation. 
The third part provides information and the background of skansen pedestrian and cyclist 
bridge project. It discusses the challenges of project both during the preparation and 
implementation phases. It also provides the goals of project and presents different illustration 
pictures of the project. 
The fourth part presents cost overview of the project. It means the cost frame of the project 
at the different stages of the project development process like designing cost, construction 
cost, construction management cost, and property acquisition cost of the case study project. 
The fifth part presents the actual cost of the project and tries to answer the questions why 
and how cost overrun happen in the case study project. 
The sixth part presents the findings of the study and discusses the cost performance of the 
case study project based on findings. 
The final chapter presents the conclusion of the study and provides recommendations for 
future studies. 
1.5 Research methodology 
Research is a process of steps that are used to collect and analyze information in order to 
increase our understanding on the issue about which we are concerned (Creswell, 2005), and 
it should be conducted in a systematic way to gain knowledge (Belbin, 1981). This subtopic  
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draws a picture about the manner in which this study has been conducted. This research 
started after consulting people who have experience and knowledge on the subject.   
It is a case study research. The case project selected after I made very important discussions 
with people at the Norwegian Public Roads Authority central region. 
The research work started with determining the research problem, and then the research 
questions.  
Then I reviewed different literatures in relation to cost overrun of construction projects and 
developed a theoretical background about project cost overrun. After developing theoretical 
backgrounds about cost overrun and the case project, the next step was collecting data. The 
first step was selecting data collection methods.  Both primary and secondary data collection 
methods are used in this research. Document investigation (secondary data collection 
method) and interviews with key people of the project (primary data collection methods) are 
applied because of their suitability for the research. The study had limitation of time and cost 
to use other data collection methods. 
In addition to investigating the case project documents, other secondary data sources such as 
literature reviews and earlier studies on cost overrun are used as a source of evidence, when 
proved appropriate. 
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2. What is cost overrun? 
2.1 Definition 
Cost overrun has been defined by different authors. I have presented here three definitions 
that are most relevant for my study. 
     A) Cost overrun: An instance in which the provision of contracted goods or services are 
claimed to require more financial resources than was originally agreed between a project and 
a contractor (User Guide, 2005) 
     B) Cost overrun: The amount by which actual costs exceed the baseline or approved 
costs (Wideman, 2002) 
      C) Cost overrun: The difference between the original cost and the actual cost when the 
project is completed (Avots, 1983) 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, cost overrun is defined as the difference between the final  
(actual) cost of construction project at completion and the original contract amount agreed 
by and between the client (the project owner) and contractor during signing of the contract. 
In short cost overrun is the amount by which actual costs exceed the baseline or approved 
costs. 
2.2 Causes of cost overrun 
 The causes of cost overrun on road construction project are varied, some are not only hard to 
predict but also difficult to manage. According to different studies, inflationary pressures, 
increase in material prices and workmen`s wages, difficulties on obtaining construction 
materials, construction delays, deficiencies in cost estimates prepared by public agencies, 
design changes, poor performance of contractors and unexpected sub soil conditions were 
the most important sources for cost overruns.  
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In addition to these deliberate underestimation, changes caused by unforeseen 
circumstances and inadequate cost management are also among the cause of cost overrun. 
Stewart (1982), attributes cost overrun to several factors that are either not controllable or 
that to a varying degree unmanageable. They include the accuracy of original cost estimate, 
degree of government regulation and control, delays, number of design changes, and labor 
related matters such as their availability, skills and increases in fringe benefits.  
According to Robert F. Cox (2007), project owners identified five reasons for project cost 
overruns. These reasons were incomplete drawings, poor pre-planning process, escalating 
cost of materials, lack of timely decisions and excessive change orders. 
Various studies have also shown that the size of a construction project influences the rate of 
cost overrun. For example large projects are generally more complex than small projects, and 
in large complex projects project studies are often not complete. Usually project studies 
documents of large and complex projects have missing and forgotten items. This leads to 
believe that the complexity and the size of projects may increase the rate of cost overrun. 
Therefore, since the stakes are higher on large projects, more care is needed from conception 
of the project until completion of large projects.  
As I discussed above factors that could influence construction costs are numerous. The 
construction project is a multidisciplinary activity and its work involves many parties such as 
the project owner and various professionals, contractors and suppliers. Thus, the total cost of 
a construction project does not depend only on a single factor but rather it depends on a 
cluster of variables that are related to the characteristics of the project and to the 
construction team as well as the market conditions. 
However, it is possible to categorize those cost overrun factors as follows, and we must deal 
on these factors for the better performance of the construction industry: 
          - Poor project management. 
          - Construction cost underestimation. 
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         - Force majeure 
         - Inappropriate/Inexperienced Contractors 
         - Shortage of construction materials and unexpected ground conditions. 
 
2.3 Effects of cost overrun 
Cost overruns have obvious effects on projects key stakeholders in particular, and on the 
construction industry in general. The various parties to a project contract do not necessarily have 
the same project goals and they have different understanding for project cost overrun. 
- From the client point of view: cost overrun implies added costs over and above those 
initially agreed up on the onset, resulting in less returns on investment. 
- To the end users: cost overrun is the added costs that is passed on as higher 
rental/lease cost or price. 
- To the professionals: cost overrun implies inability to deliver value-for-money and 
could well tarnish their reputations and results in loss of confidence.  
- To the contractor: it implies loss of profit through penalties for non-completion, and 
negative reputations that could jeopardize chances of winning other projects, if at 
fault. 
- To the construction industry as a whole: cost overruns could bring about project 
abandonment and a drop in building activities, bad reputation, and inability to secure 
project finance or securing it at higher cost due to added risks. 
Some researcher of the construction industry describe the effects of cost overrun in different 
ways. For example, Arditi (1985) stated that the effects of cost overrun are not confined to 
the construction industry but also reflected in the state of the overall economy of a country. 
Similarly other researchers have signaled that delays and cost overruns in construction 
projects prevent the planned increase in property and service production from taking place, 
and this phenomenon in turn affects, in negative way, the rate of national growth. 
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2.4 How to minimize cost overruns? 
As discussed above, cost overruns are common occurrence in road construction projects. I 
have tried to cover the causes and effects of cost overrun in the above paragraphs. In this sub 
topic, I will present some important measures that are important to minimize or prevent 
projects from having cost overruns: 
                A) Pay a lot of attention to project planning 
Planning is the most essential component of project management and it is the biggest 
weapon against cost overruns. Think of all the major scenarios and flesh out the complete 
scope of the project before making any decision on project initiatives is necessary. Once the 
scope is defined, it is also essential to get a sign-off from all stakeholders. 
     B) Check a vendor`s capabilities before hiring 
Before hiring the project to the vendor, find out their teams capabilities and check if that 
matches with the project requirements because improper skill set match can cause a 
significant drag on the projects. In addition, it should be mandatory to find out if the project 
cost estimates are realistic. 
     C) Use good scheduling tools and charts 
Improper scheduling can cause wrong cost estimation and increase the idle times of the some 
of the team members, so could use a simple Gantt chart or look for more advanced project 
scheduling tools to help you with scheduling. 
      D) Constantly track and measure the progress 
A project manager has to constantly track the progress of the various task and have various 
metrics to measure the project progress. This will provide early signal of projects cost 
overruns, while also giving opportunities to fix the issue.   
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2.5 Cost estimating at different stages of a project 
All project begins with an idea and end by filling a need. The project idea develops through 
time and realized to an actual intervention. The project idea and the cost estimate are 
prepared based on the needs of the owner by the designer. Cost estimating is a dynamic 
process that begins in the early stage of a project development process and ends when the 
project is completed and handed over to the owner. 
According to Nigel J. Smith, (1995) traditional civil engineering projects can be divided in to six 
stages: Identification, appraisal, definition, approval, implementation and operation 
These stages may not be appropriate for every project and cannot be adhered to exclusively, 
but they do offer a rational and structured approach which is applicable to many construction 
projects. Figure 2 below shows the sequence of different project stages and indicates the 
types of estimate used in each stage. 
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Figure 2.  Construction cost estimate with changes in the project stage. (Nigel J: Smith, 1995) 
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2.6 Explanation of Cost underestimation  
Another most important topic that must be discussed when I study about the cost overrun of 
construction projects is cost underestimation. Bent Flybjerg, a well-known professor at the 
Oxford University, has researched and published several articles on cost estimation. 
According to Flyvbjerg (2003), cost underestimation has four explanations: 
A) Technical Explanations 
Most studies that compare actual cost at completion and estimated costs at the beginning of 
bid award of construction project explain what they call “forecasting errors” in technical 
terms, such as imperfect techniques, inadequate data, honest mistake, and lack of experience 
on the part of forecaster. 
  B)  Economical Explanations 
Economic explanation consider cost under estimation in terms of economic rationality. 
According to Flyvbjering (2003) two types of economic explanations exist; 
    -The first explained in terms of economic self-interest, as regards self-interest, when a 
project goes forward it creates work for engineers and construction firms and many 
stakeholders makes money. If stakeholders are involved in or indirectly influence the 
forecasting process then this may influence the outcomes. 
    -The other in terms of the public interest, as regards the public interest project promoters 
and forecasters may deliberately underestimate cost in order to provide public official with an 
incentive to cut cost and thereby to save the public`s money. 
Both types of economic explanation account well for the systematic underestimation of cost. 
Both depict such underestimation as deliberate and as economically rational. 
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        C) Psychological Explanations 
Psychological explanations attempt to explain bias in the mental makeup of project 
promoters and forecasters. The most common psychological explanation is probably 
“appraisal optimism”. According to this explanation, promoters and forecasters are held to be 
overly optimistic about project outcomes in the appraisal phase when projects are planned 
and decided. The existence of appraisal optimism in promoters and forecasters would result 
in actual construction cost being higher than estimated costs.  
        D) Political Explanations 
 Political explanations interpret cost underestimation in terms of interest and power 
(Flyvbjerg 1998). A key question for political explanations is whether forecasts are 
intentionally biased to serve the interests of project promoters in getting projects started. For 
legal, economic, moral, and others reason, if promoters and forecasters have intentionally 
fabricated a deceptive cost estimate for project to get started, they are unlikely to tell 
researchers.                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      HØGSKOLEN I SØR-TRØNDELAG                                   
                      Avdeling for teknologi                                              
                      Program for bygg og miljø 
18 
 
 
3. Introduction about the case project 
3.1 Facts and figures about the project 
The project of Skansen pedestrian and Cyclist Bridge is a type of Swing Bridge which was 
constructed by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and opened for traffic on October 
9, 2014. This pedestrian and bicycle bridge project over Skansen race is  part of the Northern 
relief road of Route 706, which will form a relieving main road network along with Detour 
road, Oslo roads and E6 Trondheim-Stjørdal as shown in figure 1.2. The Project built on the 
west side of Skansen Bridge the listed flap bridge leading Doverbanen over Skansen race.  
The bridge links the pedestrian and cycle path along the Northern relief road and Ila and 
becomes a new bike route for cyclists and it replaced the previously proposed piggybacked 
pedestrian and bike lanes at Skansen railway, which cannot be realized due to the decision 
that was made to preserve railway bridge.            
 
                             Fig 3. View of Skansen pedestrian and cyclist bridge. 
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Fig 4. Skansen pedestrian and Cyclist Bridge from side view. 
The bridge is about 100 meter long and rotates from 0 degrees in the closed state to 72 
degrees in the open position. According to the project leader, Harald Inge Johnsen, at the 
Norwegian public Road Administration, it is a complicated bridge. It shall be swiveled and 
opened together with the old railway bridge when the boats are in the channel. 
This swing bridge is the first in Norway since 1952. The new footbridge is a low profile and can 
swing to the side in order not to shade the preserved railway bridge. The bridge is 100 meters 
long and the pivotal section is 70 meters and extends approximately 350 meters to connect 
the existing roads with pedestrian and cycle bridge. The bridge is built with steel and it has 
sidewalk of width 2.5 meters and 3 meters of bicycle lane. The superstructure is trussed; the  
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solution chosen for the swing bridge has similarities with Skansen Bridge. Swing bridge opens 
simultaneously with skansen railway bridge when boats going in and out of the channel. The 
trusses of the bridge consist of a welded pipe design and the truss is supported by a beam 
where the bridge rotates around. The bridge function with supporting structures of the steel 
foundations and concrete structure of the piles on the ground. The project also includes the 
preparation of pedestrian,  cycle and park areas on the east side of Skansen race, which 
contains planting, sandy beach, curbs, various forms of paving, fencing, concrete floors and 
walls, equipment for activities, games, bicycle parking, benches, garbage handling and 
lighting. 
Pedestrian and bicycle lanes over Skansen race help to shorten the travel distance with 
several miles, and create a safer pedestrian and bicycle routs to those who live around Ila and 
Byåsen area in Trondheim. Skansen race is a busy thoroughfare for pleasure boats and 
commercial traffic between Trondheim fjord and the canal. Skansen railway is a lifting bridge 
which has about 1500 opening per year.   
Skansen pedestrian and bicycle bridge has positive environmental benefits for both cyclists 
and pedestrians in Trondheim and could become a safe, efficient route for commuting cyclist, 
and provides a family friendly park area along the fjord. 
 A few facts about the project: 
      - Client of the project: Norwegians Public Road Administration (NPRA). 
      - Contractor of the project: Implenia. 
      - Architects of the project: Pir II and landscape architects SLA 
      - Consultants: Norconsult and Multiconsult  
      - Construction started on November 2013. 
      - Open for traffic on October 2014. 
      - The project financer (funding) by the state. 
      - The swing bridge has 100 meter length and the pivotal section is 70 meter long,       
approximately 350 meter long cycle roads belongs to RV 706. 
      - The value of the project: 120 million NOK 
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3.2 Challenges of the project 
Construction projects have challenges both during the preparation and implementation 
phases. Identifying those challenges and preparing preventions measures are very important 
in order to achieve the project objectives. Like other many construction projects, the Skansen 
pedestrian and bicycle bridge project has had a number of challenges. According to various 
documents at the NPRA, the following are identified as key challenges of the Skansen 
pedestrian and bicycle bridge project during the project`s implementation phase: 
- The project required good organization and clear leadership  
- Big enough focus on security in relation to workers, boat and pedestrian traffic 
at Skansen. 
- Collaboration and information flow within the agency, the community and to 
the external partners. 
- Construction under went in temporary fenced area without public traffic 
through the facility. It was important to know how to find out a good solution 
for temporary traffic that is related loading/unloading directly on Highway 706 
during the project implementation period. 
-   The challenge from technical point of view, the construction are take place not 
far away railway operation, so it is difficult to adjust with the system. 
3.3 Targets of the project 
The project has the following goals: 
- To complete and open the project to traffic for autumn 2014. 
- To complete the project without the occurrence of any serious injury or death. 
- To complete the construction of the project without affecting the environment. 
- To meet the project schedule time deadlines. 
- Make sure roads and structures shall meet all quality requirements contained 
in the agency`s standard and other guidelines. 
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                              Fig 5. Illustration plan when the bridge is close. 
 
                      HØGSKOLEN I SØR-TRØNDELAG                                   
                      Avdeling for teknologi                                              
                      Program for bygg og miljø 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              
                    Fig 6. Illustration plan when the bridge is open. 
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4. Cost overview of the project at the planning phase 
4.1 Cost frame of the project 
The project is 100% financed by the state funds. The project budget was 104 million NOK and 
it was approved in 2013. The parliament took the project up to grant ref. prop.1 S (2012-
2013) and allocated budget for 2013 to start the construction of the project 22 million NOK.  
There were two different cost estimates for the project on March 2011, the project estimated 
142 million NOK but later in April 2012 the project cost reduced to 87 million NOK.  This 
applied due to the revision of the work and the partial tax exemption because of the old VAT 
rules.  
              4.1.1 Designing cost 
       Designing: the design cost includes all costs that are used under designing phase. Costs 
that are considered as design costs in this project are:                             
                            - Cost of designing for Pir II for Norconsult. 
                            - Cost of parts controls for Multiconsult. 
                            - Cost miscellaneous for designing. 
                            - Cost designing surrounding the bridge, like bicycle parking for Multi consult.  
                            - Cost of quality control for Vitec AS. 
               4.1.2 Construction cost 
        Construction cost:  The construction cost is the major cost for the client and it covers 
over 80% of the total budget. The main contractor of this project is Implenia. Implenia is a 
construction company that specializes in complex infrastructure projects in Scandinavia. The 
cost includes: 
                        - Construction cost 
                        - Small mission miscellaneous cost; like variable traffic sign, marking the roads 
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               4.1.3 Construction management cost 
       Construction Management: Under construction management cost, there are three 
different types of costs, 
                - Cost of construction management paid per hour. 
                - Cost of miscellaneous for contractor. 
                             - Costs those are sharing with other project departments 
                 4.1.4 Property acquisition cost 
Property acquisition: the cost include, 
                             - Legal case handling expense related 
                             - Compensation payments 
Those small costs also includes costs: 
              - For future maintenance like take care of planting and adjusting of master. 
              -  Wage and price inflation this include cost of delay payment.  
              - Regulation rigging and operation-- it includes payments made for additional works 
that were not stated on the original contract.  
According to Leif Arne Hafstad, project manager of the case project, all projects in NPRA, have 
10 % contingency budget in addition to the contract cost of the project as reserve for 
additional works. This additional money is called contingency fund. Contingency fund has 
been used to cover up additional expenses that appear due to poor control and 
mismanagement of the original project budget.  Therefore the project budget stated above, 
104 million NOK includes initial engineering estimate of the project and 10 % contingency 
fund. 
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5. Actual cost overview of the project 
In this sub topic, I will try to present the actual costs of the project that are used to 
implement the project.  In addition to that I will compare the final (actual) cost of 
construction project at completion with the original contract amount, agreed between the 
client and contractor during signing of the contract. In addition, I will try to find answers for 
my research questions: the causes of cost overrun and reasons behind it. 
          5.1 Construction cost 
The construction cost is the major cost of the project and it covers over 80% of the total 
budget. The construction work is awarded to Implenia in 2013. The contract cost of the 
project was 67 423 697 NOK. (This amount include both the contract sum and contingency 
but do not include MVA). 
      - Contract sum ----------------------------------------------- 61 294 270 
      - Contingency (10%) ------------------------------------------ 6 129 427 
      - Total budget of construction ----------------------------67 423 697 NOK 
Including MVA the contract sum will be 84 279 621 NOK 
However, the actual construction cost of the project when the project completed escalated to 
96 322 000 NOK (including 25 % MVA). (This the amount of money paid for the contractor – 
Implenia). 
    - Payment based on the original contract………………………………….73 615 000 
    - New order (additional work but not stated in the contract)…….21 698 000 
    - Miscellaneous cost………………………………………………….…………………1 009 000   
    - Total sum………………………………………………………..……………………...96 322 000 NOK 
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Cost overrun in construction work is the difference of:  
           - Total sum (payment made for Impelina) --------------- 96 322 000  
           - Contract cost (including MVA)----------------------------- 84 279 621  
           - Cost overrun----------------------------------------------------12 042 379 NOK 
The first and most important reason for this cost overrun was several change orders that 
were issued during the construction phase. Most of these new works were not part of the 
original contract agreement.  They are additional works or solutions for the problems that 
occurred during the construction phase. Most of these change orders and additional works 
are accepted by the project owner, the contractor and consultant, and they are implemented 
with the consent of all these parties.  Change orders are common to most construction 
projects and they are very common in the case of large projects. In this case, the volume of 
works that are done based on these change orders demanded over 21 mil. NOK additional 
money.  
Based on the documents available at the project office, the following change orders are 
issued and approved by important stakeholders of the project.  
-T- nota 1-84 sent-------------------------16 737 101 
-T-nota 85 (E 56) ----------------------------141 500 
-T-nota 86 (E-NB-34) ------------------------65 250 
-T-nota 87 (Additionally) -------------------13 124 
-Miscellaneous cost-------------------------358 025  
Sum-----------------------------------------17 315 000 
Therefore, the additional construction costs that came to effect due to these change orders 
was (17 315 000 plus 25% MVA. That was21 698 000 NOK.  
According to the explanation which, I got during my interview with the project manager, T-
nota 1-84, 85, 87 and miscellaneous cost is a change order between a client, contractor, and 
consultant. Based on this change order, the client (NPRA) has paid more than 21 698 000 
(including MVA) NOK, because of change orders.  
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According to the manager of the project at NPRA, this happened because of the difficulty of 
boring for high pressure pile pipes. Due to unexpected ground condition the project’s 
understructure activities cannot proceed as originally expected so after a meeting between 
the client, contractor, and consultant, it is decided to change the planned construction 
method and to use other method.  So it was one of the major causes presented by the project 
manager as the reason the registered cost overrun during the construction of the project. 
On the other hand, T-nota 86 (E-NB-34), is the payment made by client for increased costs for 
performing NDT, after the client compared to Euro code, so provided in the contract. 
Selection of NDT method for control in a construction phase and control in a maintenance 
based on different criteria. 
          5.2 Designing cost 
In the design process different consultants have been contracted with NPRA.  These includes 
Multi consult AS, Nor consult AS, Pir II AS, and Vitec AS for quality control of the project. The 
contract sum or the pre-planning budget allocated for the design work of the project was 
2 365 000 NOK (include MVA). The budget and the payment was contracted based on per 
hour calculation The total time allocated for design work of the project was 2200 hours, with 
an average payment of 860 NOK per hour per person. 
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company 
 
Estimated hours 
 
Estimated cost 
(NOK) 
 
Actual cost (NOK) 
Pir plan AS and 
Norconsult AS 
 
2020 
 
1 737 270 
 
7 921 000 
Multiconsult AS   150     129 000     450 000 
For various costs 
and Vitec 
 
    30 
 
       25 800 
 
     547 000 
    
Sum 2200 1 892 000* 8 918 000** 
 
Table 1:  Project designing costs                                             
 
*Not include MVA.  When MVA included the estimated designing cost of the project will be 
2 365 000 NOK, so it is the estimated design cost of the project.   
**Including the MVA, the actual designing cost of the project is 8 918 00 NOK 
 
Therefore, cost overrun of the project during the designing phase of the project is 6, 553 000 
NOK 
           Actual cost--------------------------------8 918 000 
           Estimated cost………………………………2 365 000 
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          5.3 Cost of construction management and property acquisition 
According to the project manager of the project, Leif Arne Hafstad, it was difficult to estimate 
the construction management cost of the project and the cost of property acquisition of the 
project at the initial stage. The difficulty is due to the nature of the unpredictable 
characteristics of the project. However, according to the project manager, in this project they 
used their previous experiences from different projects.  Nevertheless, in this investigation, I 
could not find estimated cost or pre contract cost from the bid documents or from other 
sources about the estimated costs of the project construction management and property 
acquisition. 
Cost of construction management: 
 - For building managers (paid per hr.)…………………1 783 000 
 - Miscellaneous builder costs………………………………...111 000 
 - cost of sharing with other department…………….….219 000 
Sum…………………………………………………………….…….2 113 000 NOK 
Cost of property acquisition: 
-Legal case handling expense………………………...13 000 
-Compensation payments…………………………….800 000 
Sum…………………………………………………………….813 000 NOK 
 
Therefore, the total cost of property acquisition and construction management cost 
(2 113 000 +813 000) is about 2 926 000 NOK.  
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          5.4 Other small costs of the project (miscellaneous costs) 
                     -Liquidated damage…………………………………...189 812 
                    -Regulation rigging and operation……………….807 102 
                    -Remaining contract work…………………………..304 408 
                    -For future maintenances……………………………708 500*  
                   -Sum………………………………………………………….1 888 199 
*Future maintenance cost include like be planting and maintenance of the machine. 
Remarks: 
Estimated cost: defined as an expense that has been forecasted before starting the project. 
Actual cost: defined as an actual amount of money that was paid or incurred for a certain 
job. 
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6. Findings and discussion of the research 
This part of the research deals with the analysis of the data that are gathered from the case 
study project and presents discussions based on the findings and the theoretical background, 
which I developed in the previous chapters. In this chapter, most importantly I present the 
extent of cost overrun recorded and discuss the possible causes that results cost overrun in 
the project. The following Table 2 indicates summary of the project cost estimates, the actual 
cost of the project and cost overruns that occurred at different phases of the project 
development process. 
Table 2:  Summary of project estimate cost, actual cost and cost overrun at different phase of 
project development process  
Type of cost Estimated 
cost 
Actual cost Cost overrun Cost overrun 
in percentage 
Construction 
(building) 
 
84 279 621 
 
96 322 000 
 
12 042 379 
 
14 % 
Designing   2 365 000 8 918 000 6 553 000 276% 
Construction 
management 
------------  
2 113 000 
-------------- ------------- 
Property 
acquisitions 
-------------  
813 000 
------------- -------------- 
Miscellaneous 
cost 
-------------  
1 889 199 
-------------- -------------- 
 
Total sum 
 
86 644 621* 
 
110 065 199 
 
 18 595 379* 
 
7% 
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 As I mentioned before, identifying cost overrun from a project is not an easy task. There are 
many complications associated with project costs and it was not an easy run for me too. The 
most important problem starts to get the real contract amount and the actual costs of the 
project.  I have made a couple of discussions with the project manager and have tried to get 
the full picture of the project costs.  After those discussions, I decided to take the actual cost 
of the project around 111 million NOK, because when we discus with my external supervisor 
and my understanding from the bid description document there are certain, reaming 
payment, and maintains after finished the project. 
Similarly, the budget of the project is taken as 104 million NOK for this study. But it has been 
difficult to get the exact amount of the project budget.  As I discussed in the previous 
chapters there should be different cost elements that should have been considered when the 
project budget was set. At least the project budget should clearly indicate the project 
designing cost, the construction cost, the construction management cost, the property 
acquisitions cost, miscellaneous costs, and contingency. However, I have been in a difficult 
situation to find all these costs that were budgeted during the project initiation phase. For 
example the estimated construction management cost, property acquisition cost and other 
miscellaneous costs are not available.  
I have discussed the problem with the project manager. According to Leif Arne Hafstad, 
project manager at the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, some of the costs for 
instance the construction management cost is usually difficult to predict at the project 
initiation phase and the budget underwent revisions during the project construction period. 
 ** However, for the sake of this study the project budget is taken as 104 million NOK as it is 
specified in 2013 and the actual cost of the project is 111 million NOK.          
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 Once having these two costs, I have calculated the cost overrun of the project. The cost 
overrun of the project is calculated as follow and it is presented in Table 2. 
          - Actual cost……………………………………..111 million NOK    
           -Estimated cost………………………………..104 million NOK 
          -Cost overrun----------------------------------7 million NOK 
         Cost overrun of the project in percentage is 7%.  
Please have a note that this cost overrun does not include cost overruns due to construction 
management, property acquisition and miscellaneous costs.  If those have been known, the 
cost overrun could have been far above 7%.  
Having said this, I will try to explain why this 7% cost overrun happened in the project. 
From where comes this cost overrun? 
1. Changes in the construction phase 
Scholars in project management argue that it is unrealistic to eliminate changes in 
construction projects.  According to some scholars in the profession, changes are important 
to keep the relevance of the project through time. For example according to Shiferaw (2013), 
though the early design and planning of the project were correct, environmental drift can be 
a real challenge because the picture of the environment which was in fact true at the design 
stage may not be true at the point of delivery or at any particular point between. On the 
other side Eikeland (1997) discussed the basic challenge between balancing the needs for 
change and the need for cost control.  According to Eikeland, if changes are made in order to 
improve relevance of a project, and if it caused a major cost overrun, the intended profit can 
turn to loss for project owner, considering the cost consequences. From these explanations 
one can learn that changes can happen in construction projects but it can cause cost overrun. 
Therefore, the most important thing should be, there should be a limit for changes. This leads 
to believe that changes can happen and should be allowed only if the cost consequences can 
be met without exceeding the cost frame (Shiferaw, 2013).  
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As one can understand from the above explanations changes or additional works are quite 
normal practices in construction projects. Similarly, I examined and found changes in the case 
project. For example boring for high pressure pile pipes was not intended originally during the 
project-planning phase. However, the substructure of the project was changed and the 
change had a significant cost consequences.   
In my investigation, only this change has increased the cost of the project by 21 698 000. It is 
an additional budget for the project owner. It accounts almost 14% of the project 
construction cost. 
In fact, it is a cost overrun. I have discussed this with the manager of the project and I learned 
that this happened due to unexpected ground condition, and budget reserves can be used in 
occasions where changes are happened due to unexpected conditions. The New Norwegian 
approach (quality at entry) for big projects have set budget reserves for such changes but 
using money from budget reserves in addition to the original cost frame is a cost overrun. In 
my view, if the feasibility study and other geotechnical studies have been conducted well in 
the early phase, this ‘unexpected ground condition’ would have been identified from the 
beginning. This leads me to believe that weak project study at the initial phase has caused 
changes during the construction phase and this change during the implementation phase has 
cost escalating effect. This has lead finally to cost overrun of the project budget. 
2. Poor prediction of designing costs 
As I discussed before, designing cost is one of the key elements of a project budget. Getting it 
correct right from the beginning is the first step to control cost overrun of projects.  If the 
designing team has not a defined scope of work from the early beginning, it is possible to say 
that the first step for future changes is confirmed or in another way it is the first project fire 
alarm for the inevitable cost overrun.  This implies that every project should have a defined 
scope before starting to implement and the design team should know their scope and the 
project design cost should be defined.  
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In this project the design costs have skyrocketed to (8 916 000 NOK), which is 276 % above 
the original estimated designing budget (2 365 000 NOK). This implies that there is over 
6 000 000 NOK cost increment only for designing – it is too much money.  
I have discussed with Leif Arne Hafstad, manager of the project, how 6 000 000 NOK can be 
over spent in relation to the original project-designing budget.  He said that the project was 
planned many years ago and there had been several changes throughout all these years, and 
the design has been revised several times.   
Payments for the designing consultants were made based on the number of hours each 
professional involved in the project. And due to several revisions and the involvement of 
different professionals for several years, the project designing cost has increased. It is good to 
note here that all these changes are made based on the instructions from NPRA.  
Still I believe that such kind of cost overrun can be avoided by proper early planning and 
budgeting.  
In general, as I explained above cost overrun is a very sensitive and difficult issue to discuss. 
As far as the project owner of this project concerned, during my direct interviews and from 
his feed backs through emails for my questionaries, he believes that the project was 
completed in accordance with the cost and time frame, and consider the project as 
successful. 
I did not agree with some of the explanation. One of my simple question was in 2013 the 
project budget were 104 million NOK but in 2014 it went up to 111 million NOK. Is it a cost 
overrun?  The answer was that the project had budget reserve and it was allowable to use 
that money in the case of unforeseen situations. They believe that the project had got 
unforeseen situations and they used the extra money for the available reserve money and it 
should not considered as a cost overrun.  In my view, it is a cost overrun please see my 
suggestions in the recommendation part of this study regarding this matter.  
 
 
                      HØGSKOLEN I SØR-TRØNDELAG                                   
                      Avdeling for teknologi                                              
                      Program for bygg og miljø 
37 
 
 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Now it is a about time to end this thesis, but not because I do not have more questions and 
not because I think I have gotten all the answers. The truth is that I recon I only have skimmed 
the surface of this topic and there still much to be done. For instance I see the miss- 
understanding of what does it mean cost overrun in the construction projects. According to 
the universal definition, cost overrun is the difference between actual cost and estimated 
cost, but stakeholders of projects do not have similar understanding about cost overrun. I 
observed that they have different understanding. In addition to that the new Norwegian 
quality scheme has added the term budget reserve in addition to the project cost estimate 
and budget contingency.  I see that that this addition could made also the understanding a bit 
worse.   
I have differences with the project team understanding of cost overrun. I believe that skansen 
pedestrian and cycle bridge project has recorded a 7% cost overrun.  However, compared to 
other projects, it might not be a big figure but there is cost overrun and lessons should be 
learned from the project for future projects.  
I believe that it was also possible to conclude that it was possible to avoid or minimize the 
cost overrun of the Skanse project, because this study indicated that there was lack of enough 
studies on the projects substructure in the early feasibility study of the project. The 
geotechnical study might have been not compressive enough because most of the cost 
overrun came from the unexpected work of boring high pressure of pile pipes. I believe also it 
could have been avoided with proper early stage geotechnical investigation of the project.  
In addition to this, I have also observed poor forecasting of the cost of designing and as a 
matter of fact this project have recorded 270% cost overrun in designing. This figure speaks 
volumes how the design cost of the project was estimated.  I would like to recommend here 
that there is something wrong in predicting the designing cost of the project. Either the 
project scope was changed or the cost estimate was made with wrong basis. Therefore in 
either way proper adjustments are required to correctly determine the project scope and to 
fix the right budget for designing.  
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On top that I did not find cost estimates that are identified particularly for project 
construction management and for other possible small costs that could happen in the project 
development process.  Therefore, I recommend that it is very important to have general 
improvement in that direction for future projects. For example proper training for project 
stakeholders; developing new cost estimating methods, procedures and cost estimate basis, 
and creating general awareness regarding what cost overrun mean for all relevant project 
stakeholders is necessary to avoid cost overruns.  
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Why do Norwegian road projects beat their original cost? 
 
Projects beat their budget from 17- 28% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Road is one of the most important construction projects and it has a great impact on the 
 
economy of all countries. It is one of the sectors that provide crucial ingredients for the 
 
economy. In practice, however road construction projects encounter cost overrun and it is 
 
affecting economies of many countries. Therefore, cost overrun in road projects require an in- 
 
depth investigation to improve the out puts of the project. 
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These days, it is not uncommon to see road construction projects exceed their budget and 
 
failing to achieve their mission of creating facilities within specified cost. 
 
Road construction involves high additional costs for the society and many believe that roads in 
 
Norway are more expensive than they should have. Occasionally, such additional cost hit the 
 
headlines in the media. This happen when projects overshot original cost estimates and the 
 
public is aware of the most of these cost overruns. One can argue that road project are 
 
stretched across long distances, and there are substantial uncertainties that can cause cost 
 
overrun. However, identifying the real causes and preparing mitigating measures can reduce the 
 
amount of cost overrun and it needs extra attention from important parties. 
 
According to several studies, it is difficult to know the exact amount of cost overrun in road 
 
construction projects because the issue is very sensitive and it has been difficult to get 
 
important data and genuine justification from project office or government bodies. 
 
 
 
Region 
 
Number of 
 
contract 
 
Cost of 
 
estimated 
 
(mill.NOK) 
 
Actual cost 
 
estimated 
 
(mill.NOK) 
 
Cost overrun 
 
(in percentage) 
 
East Region 
 
15 
 
1379,6 
 
1713,6 
 
24,2% 
 
South Region 
 
12 
 
175,6 
 
206,3 
 
17,4% 
 
West Region 
 
19 
 
837,2 
 
991,6 
 
18,4% 
 
Mid Region 
 
24 
 
957,2 
 
1129,5 
 
18,0% 
 
North Region 
 
11 
 
298,2 
 
380,8 
 
27,7% 
 
Sum 
 
80 
 
364,7 
 
442,18 
 
21,2% 
 
 
 
Table 1.3. The actual and estimated cost of NPRA project based on region. 
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HØGSKOLEN I SØR-TRØNDELAG 
Avdeling for teknologi 
Program for bygg og miljø 
 
 
 
 
The study conducted by office of the Auditor General of Norway in 2013 based on 80 project 
 
indicated that projects recorded on average 20 % cost overrun. In addition to 25% of the 
 
project could not finished on the scheduled project time or delayed by at least six months. As 
 
shown in the above table from the studied 80 road projects that are implemented in 2013, 10 
 
projects recorded from 25 to 500 % cost overrun. 
 
The project audit was conducted on projects with a total cost of 3,647 billion NOK. However, 
 
after the investigation the Auditor General of Norway has found the projects costs increased to 
 
4,421 billion NOK. This proved that the projects costs has increased on average 21.2 %, As the 
 
table above shows, the Auditor General of Norway study report indicated that from all regions 
 
the Norwegian Public Road Administration- Projects in the region North recorded high 
 
percentage of cost overrun- 27.2 %. The second biggest cost overrun is recorded in the Eastern 
 
region, which is 24.2%. According to the report from the Audit General of Norway such kind of 
 
high cost overrun of road projects were recorded due to unrealistic project cost estimation, 
 
assumptions and wrong estimation basis. 
 
In addition to this different documents and studies on project cost overrun indicated: missing 
 
proper investigation of soil condition and unable to find relevant technical solution before the 
 
project start up. The contractors’ attitude to get more money from the under studied projects 
 
by raising different claims and getting more money than they deserved. The project 
 
development process, procedure and in general the project management capacity of the NPRA 
 
has contributed for the observed cost overrun and it needs proper attention to improve the 
 
efficiency of projects performance. 
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The Project: 
 
Cost overrun involves unexpected cost incurred in excess of budget amounts due to different factors. Within this mind, this 
thesis investigated cost overrun factors in a road project at the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) – 
pedestrian and cyclist bridge at Skansen. The project is located in Sør-Trøndelag and it is a swing bridge and located 
between Ila and Brattøra. The project completed and officially opened for traffic on October 2014. 
 
Targets: 
 
The targets of this study initiated from the basic theoretical concept of project cost overrun and identifying the main cause 
of cost overrun on the project and developing mitigating measures. 
 
Assessment: 
- Bid description 
- Summary of settlement 
 
- Additional work and payment form. 
Conclusion: 
The initial cost of the project that was estimated by the NPRA was 104 million NOK and the cost of the project when it is 
completed was 111 million NOK. I have conclude that the size of the cost overrun of the project is 7 %. 
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Utskriftsdato: 21.05.2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Svein Hove 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1300/500 høy/lav 
verdi) 
 
 
Variable 
skilt, 
oppmerkin
g veg Midl 
flytting av 
båter.. 
 
 
 
110300 
Tildelinger (løpende kroner) inkl mva 1 298 1 510 
 
 
 
Tildeling 2015 6 000 
Merforbruk 2014 -785 
Disponible midler 2015 5 215 
 
 
KOSTNADSOVERSIKT SKANSENLØPET GSV-BRU 
Ansvar 43321 - Prosjekt 404649 - Bev.kode 0343 - Fylke 6A 
 
Løpende kroner 
 
Februar 2015 
 
 
Kontrakt 
 
 
Disp.nr. 
 
 
Kontraktssum 
 
 
Påløpt 2013 
 
 
Påløpt 2014 
 
 
Påløpt 2015 
 
Budsjett 
2015 
 
Prognose 2015 
 
 
Sum 
 Byggeledelse 
 
 
 
Prosjektering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grunnerverv 
 
 
Entrepriser 
 
 
 
 
Usikkerhet 
 
Timer byggeledelse 0001 
 
746 887 55 150 150 1 783 
Diverse byggherrekostnader 0002 
  
97 4 10 10 111 
Andel Prosjektavdelingen 0003 
 
58 111 
 
50 50 219 
Sum byggeledelse 
  
808 1 095 59 210 210 2 113 
Pir II, Norconsult m.fler - prosjektering 0004 
 
4 051 3 770 95 100 100 7 921 
Multiconsult-3.partskontroll 0005 
 
71 191 
 
10 10 272 
Ressurs timer 0006 
     
0 0 
Diverse kostnader prosjektering 0007 
 
44 
    
44 
Multiconsult - miljø 0015 
  
178 20 
  
178 
Kvalitetskontroll verft/brusted (Vitec) 0014 
  
503 
  
0 503 
Testkjøring 
      
0 0 
Sum prosjektering 
  
4 166 4 642 115 110 110 8 918 
Saksomkostninger/timer Eiendom 0008 
 
13 
    
13 
Erstatningsutbetalinger 0009 
    
800 800 800 
Sum grunnerverv 
  
13 0 0 800 800 813 
Implenia 0010/11 61 294 30 204 60 277 5 841 5 343 5 343 95 824 
Diverse småoppdrag 0013 
 
0 280 45 50 50 330 
Tiltak stenging 0013 
      
0 
Sum entrepriser 
  
30 204 60 557 5 886 5 393 5 393 96 154 
         
Reservepost 
   
0 0 -1 298 
 
0 
     
0 0 
 
Totalt løpende kroner 
 
2015 kroner 
 
35 191 
 
66 294 
 
6 060 
 
5 215 
 
6 513 
 
107 998 
 
37 081 
 
68 217   
 
6 513 
 
111 810 
Opprinnelig styringsramme 2012 kroner
 91,
0 2012-2013 = 2013 kroner                                              1,029 %
Ny styringsramme 104,6
2013-2014 = 2014 kroner 1,024 % 107,2
2014-2015 = 2015 kroner 1,029 % 110,3
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Skansen G/S bru 
 
 
Sammendrag sluttoppgjør 
 Kontraktssum: 61 294 270,- 
 
 
Beskrivelse Beløp Delsum Sum 
 
1 Sluttavregning kontrakt 
 
Sum målebrev 
- Tidligere fakturerte A-notaer 1-11 
Rest å fakturere ex innestående 
 
 
59 516 194 
 
 
 
59 516 194 
######### 
 
 
 
 
 
1 080 908 1 080 908 
 
2 Framtidig vedlikehold 
 
Vedlikehold maskiner i 2 år - D216 
- Prosess 88.7627 
 
 
 
 
 
361 000 
 
 
 
 
 
361 000 
 
 
 
 
 
408 250 
 
 
7 500 
 
 
3 750 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
780 500 
Vedlikehold beplantning i 3 år - D223 
- Prosess 74.721 
- Prosess74.722 
- Prosess 74.73 
 
Justering master etter 1 år - D218 
- 76.3427 
 
Justering master etter 1år - D227-1 
- 76.3429 
 
157 850 
164 000 
86 400 
 
 
7 500 
 
 
3 750 
 
3 Lønns- og prisstigning 
- Avregning A-notaer 
- T-notaer 
 
73 899 
115 913 
 
73 899 
115 913 
 
 
189 812 
 
4 Endringsarbeid 
 
T-notaer 1-84 sendt 
T-nota 85 (E 56) 
T-nota 86 E-NB-34) 
T-nota 87 (tillegg E-NB-19) 
 
 
 
16 737 101 
141 500 
65 250 
13 124 
 
 
16 737 101 
141 500 
65 250 
13 124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 956 975 
   
 
5 Regulering rigg og drift 
 
Utført arbeid i hht målebrev 
Tilleggsarbeid 
 
Kontraktssum 
Tillegg 10 % 
Reguleringsbeløp 
 
 
59 516 194 
15 978 524 
 
 
 
 
75 494 718 
 
 
67 423 697 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 071 021 
 
61 294 270 
6 129 427 
  807 102 
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6 Dagmulkt 
 
I hhr overtagelsesforretning 
 
 
-40 000 
  
 
7 Fakturering ved sluttoppgjør 
 
Rest kontraktsarbeid 
Innestående 
Separat fakturering av vedlikehold 
Fakturabeløp 
 
Inntrekking rest forskudd 
 
Dagmulkt 
 
LPS A-notaer 
LPS T-notaer 
 
Faktura økt rigg og drift 
 
Vedlikehold 2015 
- Vedlikehold maskiner - D216 
- Vedlikehold beplantning - D223 
- Justering master - D218 og 227-1 
 
Vedlikehold 2016 
- Vedlikehold maskiner - D216 
- Vedlikehold beplantning - D223 
 
Vedlikehold 2017 
- Vedlikehold beplantning - D223 
 
Sum rest fakturering ex mva 
 
 
- Rest forskudd 
- Dagmulkt 
 
 
 
1 080 908 
- 
 
 
 
 
1 080 908 
-780 500 
300 408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
327 833 
 
 
 
 
316 583 
 
 
136 084 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 812 
 
807 102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
780 500 
 
 
 
 
-585 898 
 
-40 000 
 
73 899 
115 913 
 
807 102 
 
 
180 500 
136 083 
11 250 
 
 
180 500 
136 083 
 
 
136 084 
 
 
2 077 822 
 
 
-585 898 
-40 000 
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rev 3, 070215 / tb 
 
 
Merknader 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fakt. med forfall 2015 og 2016, 
 
 
 
Fakt. med forfall 2015, 2016,2017 
dvs. 136.083 - 136.083 - 136.084 
 
 
 
 
Fakt. med forfall 2015 
 
 
 
Fakt. med forfall 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forfall 31.05.15 
Forfall 31.05.15 
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Forfallsdato 30.06.15 
 
 
 
 
Forfallsdato 30.06.16 
 
 
Forfallsdato 30.06.17 
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PIR II 
 
GANG-/SYKKELBRU OVER SKANSENLØPET - f.o.m. 01.08.13 
Bru nr. 16-1739 
 
 
TIMEBUDSJETT FRA OG MED 01.08.2013 
 
 
SAMLET BUDSJETT TIMER 
 
 
 
 
 
1 240 
 
 
 
 
23
0 
55
Arbeidsunderlag entreprenør + dokumentasjon teknisk 
godkjenning 
Norconsult AS 
 
Oppfølging i byggeperioden 
Pir II Plan AS 
Norconsult AS 
Multiconsult AS 
Sum oppfølging i byggeperioden 930 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
1 790 
150 
SAMLET 
Pir II Plan AS 
Norconsult AS 
Multiconsult AS 
Samlet budsjett, PG 2 170 
 
SAMLET BUDSJETT, AVRUNDET 2 200 
 
 
 
Gjennomsnittlig timepris eks.mva 
 
Budsjett (kr), eks. mva. 
Merverdiavgift 
kr 860 
 
kr 1 892 000 
kr 473 000 
Samlet budsjett (kr) inkl. mva. 
 
kr 2 365 000 
 
 
 
 
09.09.2013 
HMR 
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Spørsmål til byggeleder av prosjekt, med svar 
 
 
 
1- Som prosjektleder av skansen bru, tror du prosjektet blir vellykket i forhold til 
kostnader og tidsramme? 
 
Prosjektet ble gjennomført i henhold til kostnadsramme og tidsramme og anses som 
vellykket. 
 
2- Budsjettrammen for prosjektet var 104 millioner kroner i 2013, men det koster rundt 
111 millioner kroner i 2014. Fra ditt ståsted hva betyr det? 
 
Omregnet til 2014 kroner er det en liten overskridelse av budsjettet, men prosjektet benyttet 
seg av reservepotten som var avsatt til benyttelse ved uforutsett (risikomidler) 
 
3-Vanligvis antar man en kostnadsoverskridelse i ett prosjekt, men i 
prosjekteringsarbeidet alene er det nesten kostnadsoverskridelse på 6 millioner kroner. 
Hvorfor skjedde det? 
 
Prosjektet innehar en bru som ikke var bygget i Norge på 60 år, videre var det 3 faglige 
miljøer som vektla og stilte krav til byggingens utforming/driftssikkerhet. Det var også mye 
arbeide med å designe en bru til kostnadsnivå som var akseptabelt for Staten. Derav er det 
brukt mye tid på utkast og revisjon av de fra konsulentens side, dette etter anvisning fra 
Statens vegvesen. 
 
4-Fra min beregning prosjektet koste rundt 111 millioner kroner, men verdien av brua er 
120 millioner kroner. Hva betyr det? 
 
Prosjektavsetning var ca 120 mill, det betyr at det var avsatt noe mere penger en benyttet. 
 
5- Det er vanskelig for meg å finne ut kontraktssum på byggeledelse og grunnerverv for 
prosjektet. Er vanskelig å gjøre overslag av denne kostnaden? 
 
Det er ikke kontrakt på byggeledelse da det er interne ressurser(personer) Det benyttes 
da overslag på de kostnader og de revideres årlig i prosjektperioden. 
 
6-Hvordan gjøres vedtak på prosjektet, hvis det skjer endringsordre eller tilleggsarbeid? 
 
Entreprenøren oversender skriftlig endringsanmodning/krav og beskriver hvorfor han mener 
det er en endring i forhold til kontrakten. Byggeleder vurdere kravet mot kontrakten og sier 
seg enig/eller gir avslag på kravet da oppfatningen er at kontrakten dekker arbeide. Er 
byggeleder enig i kravet går det til prising av entreprenør. Når pris kommer vurderes kravets 
innhold og konsekvenser med hensyn til hvordan det skal betales. F. eks etter nytt pristilbud 
eller som regnings arbeid. Det avklares også om endringen har konsekvens for 
fremdriften(tidskrav), 
 
Tilleggsarbeid bestilles av byggeleder gjennom endring av arbeidstegning og 
endringsordre, der foreslås det også om entreprenøren skal komme med pristilbud eller 
om tillegget avregnes som regnings arbeid. 
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7- Hvis det er kostnadsoverskridelse på prosjektet, hvem og hvordan bestemmer 
ekstra betaling? 
 
Byggeleder har en ramme gjennom budsjett som er han fullmakt til å bestille innenfor, 
denne ramme har tatt høyde for kostnadsøkning etter avtale med prosjektleder. 
 
Prosjektleder/Avd. direktør har en risikoavsetning som kan tildeles etter anmodning av 
prosjektleder, den ligger i tillegg til ramme byggeleder/prosjektleder disponerer. 
 
8- Fra mine funn (basert på beregning) er kostnadsoverskridelse på prosjektet ca 
rundt 7%? Er dette greie tall for deg som prosjektleder? 
 
- kostnads av prosjekt....................................111 million NOK 
 
-Kostnadsramme på(2013) ...........................104 million NOK 
 
Prosjektet måles mot prosjektkostnad og er ikke definert til å ha kostnadsoverskridelse. 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser NS8406 
 
In
fo
 
 
Skjema for endring og tillegg 
Skjemaet skal benyttes av både entreprenør (varsel og krav) og byggherre (prisforespørsel og endringsordre) 
 
Prosjekt 
 
E6 Trondheim – Stjørdal 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Implenia AS 
 
Kontraktsnummer 
 
-V-E-7 
 
Byggherre 
 
Statens vegvesen 
 
 
Byggeleder SVV 
 
Leif Arne Hafstad 
 
Kontraktsnavn 
 
Skansen G/S-bru 
 
Løpenr fra eRoom 
 
14 
 
Tittel 
 
Borring høytrykkspyling av pelerør 
 
 
 
 
Steg 1 – Varsel om: 
 
P
ri
sf
o
re
sp
ø
rs
e
l 
/ 
k
ra
v
 
 
Fra byggherre 
Prisforespørsel 
Rekvirering av endringsarbeid 
 
Fra entreprenør 
 
 
Varsel om endring 
Varsel om dekning av merutgifter 
Varsel om fristforlengelse 
Pristilbud 
 
 
 
Beskrivelse fra: 
Byggherre Entreprenør 
 
På grunn av sannsynlig gammel steinfylling i området pelene skal slås ned er det 
blit pelt gjennom større steiner. Disse steinene umuligjør grabbing / spyling med 
vanlig utstyr for å få ut massene. 
 
Viser til møte avholdt mellom Entreprenør, peleentreprenø, byggherre og 
byggherrens konsulent. Det ble på dette møte bestemt at borring var den beste 
løsningen. 
 
Dette er å anse som et tillegg da prosessen i kontrakten ikke kan benyttes. 
 
Entreprenøren venter i denne stund på pristilbud fra UE. Dette vil bli overlevert 
umiddelbart etter det er mottatt entreprenør. 
 
Nå det gjelder tidsbruken vil det gå lenger tid på grunn av dette. Denne operasjonen 
ligger på kritisk linje i forhold til betongarbeidet. Vi får ikke gjort noe betongarbeid i 
kassene før borringen er utført. 
Vi vil komme tilbake til spesifikke tidskonsekvens når dette er kjent. 
 
Dato: 14.03.14 
 
Sign: HAa 
 
Svar/kommentar fra: 
Byggherre Entreprenør 
 
BH ber om dokumentasjon på steinstørrelse og mengde stein i ett utvalg av pelene 
som bores. Viser til møte om metodevalg og BH aksept for boring. BH ber om at 
pristilbud oversendes umiddelbart som avtalt, tilbudet skal også inneholde 
timepriser for valgt utsyr. 
 
Dato: 2014-03-17 
 
Sign: lah 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser NS8406 
 
Steg 2 - Spesifisering av prisforespørsel/rekvisisjon/krav: 
 
S
p
e
si
fi
se
ri
n
g
 
 
Spesifisering: 
 
Spesifisert oppsett (fylles ut av entreprenøren): 
 Forslag til 
oppgjørsform 
 
   
Kontraktens enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.2 Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. . 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Justerte enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.3. Prisreguleres i t. C3 pkt. 8. 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Avtalt pris dagens prisnivå inkl. rigg. Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra 
riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Regningsarbeid iht. kontraktens timepriser. Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. 8 
Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
Fast pris Mengderegulert 
Konsekvens 
 
  
Konsekvens for K/HMS 
Konsekvens for framdrift (C1 pkt. 19) 
 
  
Konsekvenser for pris (C1 pkt. 19) 
  
 
Vedlegg 
 
  
Timelister 
  
Brev 
  
  
Fakturagrunnlag 
 
 Annet 
  
Dato: 
 
Sign: 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser NS8406 
Steg 3 – Avklaringer: 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Oversikt over maskinvalg og priser som følger: 
 
Timepriser i kontrakt er benyttet for det meste utstyret 
 
Timepris borrigg 3 360,- pr time, og min driftstid 10,5 time pr dag 
 
Hjelpemann kr 600,- pr t 
 
Transportkostnader etter regning 
 
Materialkostnader som foringsrør/borrkroner etter regning 
 
Forberedende arbeider oppgjort etter timelister 
 
Mobilkran kr 1 100,- pr time 
 
Flåte/Lekter 1 500,- pr time 
 
Øvrige arbeider som for eksempel fjerning av oppborede masser, sugebil mm. 
Gjøres opp som regningearbeid. 
 
 
Dette arbeidet vil foregå på kritisk linje fremdriftsmessig. Det er vanskelig på forhånd 
og si hvor lenge dette arbeidet vil ta. Vi vil komme tilbake til dette. 
For å avhjelpe arbeider på kritisk linje kan vi leie inn ytterligere en lekter i tillegg til 
den som brukes pr i dag. 
 
Dokumentasjon på mengde stein vil bli gjort i form av lodding. Resultatet av dette vil 
bli oversendt byggherre så snart disse foreligger. 
Dokumentasjon av størrelse på stein bli noe utfordrende da steinen ligger dypt nede i 
pelerør, samt disse vil bli borret i stykker for å få de opp. 
 
Vi har tatt vare på noen av de største steinene vi fikk opp ved å nytte tradisjonelt 
utstyr. 
 
Dato: 
 
18.03.14 Sign: 
 
HAa 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
BH bekrefter at regningsarbeid benyttes, vi forutsetter at timepriser som ligger i 
kontraktens E 4 prisskjema benyttes, samt krav til fortløpende rapportering. 
Entreprenøren skal innhente hjelpesutstyr for optimal fremdrift som minimaliserer 
merkostnader og tidsforkyvninger av andre tidskritiske arbeider. 
Dato: 
 
2014-03-20 Sign: 
 
lah 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser NS8406 
 
 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Vi har fom 22/4-14 fått tilgang til utstøping av peler i akse 4. 
 
For at fjerning av masser i de resterende peler ikke vil hindre vår fremdrift på 
betongarbeid og montering av stålbru, har vi fått vår UE til å anskaffe en ekstra 
lekter samt nødvedig utstyr for å håndtere sine arbeider med fjerning av i pel, samt 
at det fortsatt jobbes 2 skift ( nattarbeid ). 
 
Vår UE ønsker å benytte en pelemaskin til å løfting av sug, slik at dette er en 
maskin som kommer i tillegg til tidligere oppgitte maskinpriser. 
 
Timepris pelerigg kr. 1.155,-/tv eks. fører. 
Denne pelemaskinen medfører at vår UE må ha mist 3 mann til å fjerne masser i 
pel. 
 
Entreprenøren ber BH om å ta en befaring på anlegget for å se om de er tilfredstilt 
med måten vi jobber på med tanke på fjerning av masser i pel. 
 
Entreprenøren vil på ingen måte påføre BH unødvednige kostnader, samtidig som vi 
ikke ønsker å bli påført kostnader fra vår UE som ikke BH er villig til å dekke. 
Dato: 
 
24.04.2014 Sign: 
 
ØNo 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Det viser seg at ved boring av pelerør i akse 2,5 og 6, har enkelte rør sunket opp til 
7 cm som følger av ristninger boremaskinen har forårsaket. Her blir entreprenør 
nødt til å sveise på rørene for å rette opp høydeavvikene i topp pel. 
Kostnadene ved dette vil bli krevd kompensert av byggherre. Dokumentasjon på 
disse kostnadene legges ut på E-room. 
Dato: 28.05.2014 Sign: JF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Årsaken til enkelte peler er for lave i possisjon, er vel avklart i møte den 23. juni 
2014. PDA målinger. PDA målinger er beskrevet i kontrakten og entreprenøren skal 
ta høyde for bevegelse ved PDA målinger. 
Dato: 
 
2014-06-27 Sign: 
 
lah 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Endring vedrørende fjerning av masser i pelerør er avsluttet, og alt av innestående 
er fakturert byggherre. Entreprenør returnerer endringsgrunnlag for signering av 
byggherre. 
Dato: 
 
25.09.14 Sign: 
 
JF 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser NS8406 
 
 
 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
 
Sign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
 
Sign: 
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Kontraktsbestemmelser 
NS8406 Steg 4: Endringsordre 
 
 
Byggherrens konklusjon: 
Endring avregnet etter medgått tid og fakturaunderlag som ligger som vedlegg. 
 
Oppgjørsform 
 
  
Kontraktens enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.2. Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. 8. 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad etter C3 pkt. 11. 
 
  
Justerte enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.3. Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. 8. 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad etter C3 pkt. 11. 
 
  
Avtalt pris dagens prisnivå inkl. rigg. Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra 
riggkostnad etter C3 pkt. 11. 
 
  
Regningsarbeid ihht. kontraktens timepriser. Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. 
8. Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad etter C3 pkt. 11. 
 
 
 
Fast pris 
 
 
Mengderegulert 
 
 
Konsekvens 
 
 
Konsekvens for K/HMS 
Konsekvens for framdrift (C1 pkt. 19) 
 
 
Konsekvens for pris (C1 pkt. 19) 
   
 
Dato 
 
2014-10-04 Sign byggherre 
 
lah 
   
Dato 
 
 
Sign entreprenør 
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In
fo
 
 
Skjema for endring og tillegg 
Skjemaet skal benyttes av både entreprenør (varsel og krav) og byggherre (prisforespørsel og endringsordre) 
 
Prosjekt 
 
E6 Trondheim – Stjørdal 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Implenia AS 
 
Kontraktsnummer 
 
-V-E-7 
 
Byggherre 
 
Statens vegvesen 
 
 
Byggeleder SVV 
 
Leif Arne Hafstad 
 
Kontraktsnavn 
 
Skansen G/S-bru 
 
Løpenr fra eRoom 
 
-NB 03 
 
Tittel 
 
Økt NDT kontroll grunnet endring fra Eurokoden til HB 026 
 
 
 
 
Steg 1 – Varsel om: 
 
P
ri
sf
o
re
sp
ø
rs
e
l 
/ 
k
ra
v
 
 
Fra byggherre 
Prisforespørsel 
Rekvirering av endringsarbeid 
 
Fra entreprenør 
 
 
Varsel om endring 
Varsel om dekning av merutgifter 
Varsel om fristforlengelse 
Pristilbud 
 
 
 
Beskrivelse fra: 
Byggherre Entreprenør 
 
Økte kostnader for utførelse av NDT-kontroll etter HB 026 i forhold til Eurokoden slik 
forutsatt i kontrakten. 
 
Vedlagte kostnadsoppsett viser enhetspriser for ulike kontrollmetoder multiplisert 
med et estimat over lm sveis. Avregning vil bli i hht dokumenterte kontrollerte lm. 
 
Dato: 2014-03-25 
 
Sign: TB 
 
Svar/kommentar fra: 
Byggherre Entreprenør 
 
Kontrakten beskriver kontrollomfang etter HB 026. Kap D215 - 1. har spesifikasjon 
på akseptkriterier og kontrollomfang som entreprenøren har priset, og vi kan ikke se 
at kontroll er endret i omfang. Kontraktens prisunderlag følger HB 026 i Kap D215. 
 
Dato: 2014-04-10 
 
Sign: lah 
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Steg 2 - Spesifisering av prisforespørsel/rekvisisjon/krav: 
 
S
p
e
si
fi
se
ri
n
g
 
 
Spesifisering: 
 
Spesifisert oppsett (fylles ut av entreprenøren): 
 Forslag til 
oppgjørsform 
 
   
Kontraktens enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.2 Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. . 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Justerte enhetspriser C1 pkt. 22.3. Prisreguleres i t. C3 pkt. 8. 
Gir grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Avtalt pris dagens prisnivå inkl. rigg. Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra 
riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
   
Regningsarbeid iht. kontraktens timepriser. Prisreguleres iht. C3 pkt. 8 
Gir ikke grunnlag for ekstra riggkostnad iht. C3 pkt. 11. 
 
Fast pris Mengderegulert 
Konsekvens 
 
  
Konsekvens for K/HMS 
Konsekvens for framdrift (C1 pkt. 19) 
 
  
Konsekvenser for pris (C1 pkt. 19) 
  
 
Vedlegg 
 
  
Timelister 
  
Brev 
  
  
Fakturagrunnlag 
 
 Annet 
  
Dato: 
 
Sign: 
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Steg 3 – Avklaringer: 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Viser til møte i saken. Vedlegger notat av 5. mai 2014 som tilsvar. 
Dato: 
 
2014-05-05 Sign: 
 
lah 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Viser til sakens notater og tilsvar som definerer mengden med kontroll og hvilke 
kontrollklasser som benyttes på de enkelste konstruksjonene. Ved en beregning 
som legger til grunn kontraktens prisgrunnlag og økt mengde er pristilegget vurdert 
til størrelsesorden NOK 600 000 - 700 000. Vi foreslår ett oppgjør til NOK 650 000,-
Alternativt måles mengder og 75% av enhetsprisnivå i vedlagte regneark fra 
entreprenøren legges til grunn. 
Dato: 
 
2014-05-21 Sign: 
 
lah 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
Forslaget fra byggherren ble tidligere avvist, både mhp RS forslaget til endelig 
oppgjør, samt utspillet om kun 75 % av enhetsprisene. 
Vedlagt følger oppsett fra JVP Steel over antall sveiste lengdemeter. Mengdene er 
dokumentert med referanse til tegn.nr, sveisenr, sveiselengde og type sveis. 
Vedlegger også oppdatert kostnadsberegning. 
 
Samlet krav er kr. 1.567.750,- ex mva 
 
Dato: 
 
2014-09-11 Sign: 
 
TB 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
 
Sign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
Sign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
Sign: 
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Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
 
Sign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kommentar / svar: 
  
Byggherre 
 
Entreprenør 
 
Dato: 
 
 
Sign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
